Michele Peroli

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In security protocol analysis, the traditional choice to consider a single Dolev-Yao attacker is supported by the fact that models with multiple collaborating Dolev-Yao attackers have been shown to be reducible to models with one Dolev-Yao attacker. In this paper, we take a fundamentally different approach and investigate the case of multiple(More)
Although computer security typically revolves around threats, attacks and defenses, the sub-field of security protocol analysis (SPA) has so far focused almost exclusively on attacks. In this paper, we show that such focus on attacks depends on few critical assumptions that have been characteristic of the field and have governed its mindset, approach and(More)
Security protocols are often found to be flawed after their deployment. We present an approach that aims at the neutralization or mitigation of the attacks to flawed protocols: it avoids the complete dismissal of the interested protocol and allows honest agents to continue to use it until a corrected version is released. Our approach is based on the(More)
There exist an abundant number of tools for aiding developers and penetration testers to spot common software security vulnerabilities. However, testers are often confronted with situations where existing tools are of little help because a) they do not account for a particular configuration of the SUT and b) they do not include tests for certain(More)
Citation: Fiazza M-C, Peroli M and Viganò L (2015) Defending vulnerable security protocols by means of attack interference in non-collaborative scenarios. In security protocol analysis, the traditional choice to consider a single Dolev–Yao attacker is supported by the fact that models with multiple collaborating Dolev–Yao attackers are reducible to models(More)
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