Michal Szkup

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We study costly information acquisition in global games (coordination games where payo¤s are discontinuous in the unobserved state and in the average action of agents). We show that only symmetric equilibria exist and we provide su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness. We then characterize the value of information in this context and link it to the underlying(More)
We study costly information acquisition in global games, which are coordination games where payo¤s are discontinuous in the unobserved state and in the average action of agents. We show that only symmetric equilibria exist and we provide su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness. We then characterize the value of information in this context and link it to the(More)
I study a dynamic model of optimal funding to understand the use of financial assets as collateral. Borrowers need to raise funds to invest in risky projects whose return is non-verifiable and, thus, noncontractible. Firms with investment opportunities tomorrow value the asset more than those without them: the asset partially solves the non-contractibility(More)
This paper asks whether a government can implement policies that help to avert a crisis driven by self-fulfilling expectations. I consider two policies that are often at the center of political discussions, namely austerity and fiscal stimulus. I find that under plausible conditions austerity tends to decrease the probability of a debt crisis, while(More)
Empirical evidence in several fields has identified wake-up calls as an important channel of contagion. We propose a theory of contagion based on the information choice of investors after a wake-up call. We study global coordination games of regime change with two regions where local fundamentals have an unobserved common component. A crisis in the first(More)
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