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Lack of cooperation (free riding) is one of the key problems that confronts today's P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems pose: large populations, high turnover, a symmetry of interest, collusion, zero-cost identities, and traitors. To tackle these challenges we model the P2P system(More)
We develop a model to study the phenomenon of free-riding in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. At the heart of our model is a user of a certain <i>type</i>, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user's willingness to contribute resources to the system. A user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current contribution cost in(More)
A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst case strong equilibrium to the social optimum. In contrast to the traditional price of anarchy, which quantifies the loss incurred due to both selfishness and lack of coordination,(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t We introduce a game-theoretic model of diffusion of technologies, advertisements, or influence through a social network. The novelty in our model is that the players are interested parties outside the network. We study the relation between the diameter of the network and the existence of pure Nash equilibria in the(More)
Simultaneous item auctions are simple and practical procedures for allocating items to bidders with potentially complex preferences. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits independent bids on all items simultaneously. The allocation and prices are then resolved for each item separately, based solely on the bids submitted on that item. We study the(More)
While the fundamental premise of peer-to-peer (P2P) systems is that of voluntary resource sharing among individual peers, there is an inherent tension between individual rationality and collective welfare that threatens the viability of these systems. This paper surveys recent research at the intersection of economics and computer science that targets the(More)
In this work we study cost sharing connection games, where each player has a source and sink he would like to connect, and the cost of the edges is either shared equally (fair connection games) or in an arbitrary way (general connection games).We study the graph topologies that guarantee the existence of a strong equilibrium (where no coalition can improve(More)
We study the problem of allocating shared resources, such as bandwidth in computer networks and computational resources in shared clusters, among multiple users by the proportional-share market mechanism. Under this mechanism, each user partitions his budget among the multiple resources and receives a fraction of each resource proportional to his bid. We(More)