Michail Fasoulakis

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We present a new, distributed method to compute approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that analyze the two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a single LP that combines the two players payoffs), our algorithm first solves two independent LPs, each of which is derived from one of the two(More)
It is known that Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria not necessarily optimize social optima of bimatrix games. In this paper, we show that for every fixed ε > 0, every bimatrix game (with values in [0, 1]) has an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with the total payoff of the players at least a constant factor, (1 − √ 1− ε), of the optimum.(More)
The ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than ε to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed strategy. The smallest constant ε currently known for which there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ε-well-supported Nash(More)
We pose the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with two simultaneous criteria of optimization: minimization of the incentives to deviate from a strategy profile and maximization of a measure of quality of the strategy profile. We consider two natural measures of quality: the maximum and the minimum of the payoffs of the two(More)
We apply existing, and develop new, zero-sum game techniques for designing polynomial-time algorithms to compute additive approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In particular, we give a polynomial-time algorithm that given an arbitrary bimatrix game as an input, outputs either an additive 1 3 -Nash equilibrium or an additive 1 2 -well-supported Nash(More)
In this paper we study the complexity of finding approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player normal-form games. First, for any constant number n, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a relative ( 1− 1 1+(n−1)n ) -Nash equilibrium in arbitrary nplayer games and a relative ( 1− 1 1+(n−1)n−1 ) -Nash equilibrium in symmetric n-player games.(More)
We consider the Gaussian interference channel as a non-cooperative game taking into account the cost of the transmission. We study the conditions of the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Particularly, for the many-user case we give sufficient conditions that lead to a Nash equilibrium, and for the two-user case we exhaustively describe the conditions of(More)
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