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We present a new, distributed method to compute approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that analyze the two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a single LP that combines the two players payoffs), our algorithm first solves two independent LPs, each of which is derived from one of the two… (More)

- Artur Czumaj, Michail Fasoulakis, Marcin Jurdzinski
- IJCAI
- 2015

It is known that Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria not necessarily optimize social optima of bimatrix games. In this paper, we show that for every fixed ε > 0, every bimatrix game (with values in [0, 1]) has an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with the total payoff of the players at least a constant factor, (1 − √ 1− ε), of the optimum.… (More)

- Artur Czumaj, Michail Fasoulakis, Marcin Jurdzinski
- SAGT
- 2014

The ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than ε to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed strategy. The smallest constant ε currently known for which there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ε-well-supported Nash… (More)

We pose the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with two simultaneous criteria of optimization: minimization of the incentives to deviate from a strategy profile and maximization of a measure of quality of the strategy profile. We consider two natural measures of quality: the maximum and the minimum of the payoffs of the two… (More)

- Artur Czumaj, Michail Fasoulakis, Marcin Jurdzinski
- AAMAS
- 2017

We apply existing, and develop new, zero-sum game techniques for designing polynomial-time algorithms to compute additive approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In particular, we give a polynomial-time algorithm that given an arbitrary bimatrix game as an input, outputs either an additive 1 3 -Nash equilibrium or an additive 1 2 -well-supported Nash… (More)

- Artur Czumaj, Michail Fasoulakis, Marcin Jurdzinski
- AAMAS
- 2017

In this paper we study the complexity of finding approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player normal-form games. First, for any constant number n, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a relative ( 1− 1 1+(n−1)n ) -Nash equilibrium in arbitrary nplayer games and a relative ( 1− 1 1+(n−1)n−1 ) -Nash equilibrium in symmetric n-player games.… (More)

- Artur Czumaj, Michail Fasoulakis, Marcin Jurdzinski
- AAMAS
- 2016

- Michail Fasoulakis, Apostolos Traganitis, Anthony Ephremides
- 2017 15th International Symposium on Modeling and…
- 2017

We consider the Gaussian interference channel as a non-cooperative game taking into account the cost of the transmission. We study the conditions of the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Particularly, for the many-user case we give sufficient conditions that lead to a Nash equilibrium, and for the two-user case we exhaustively describe the conditions of… (More)

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