Michael V. Antony

Learn More
Papineau's argument in Thinking About Consciousness for the vagueness or indeterminacy of phenomenal concepts is discussed. Several problems with his argument are brought out, and it is concluded that his argument fails to establish his desired conclusion. I In Thinking About Consciousness, David Papineau (2002) argues that our phenomenal concepts are(More)
me a very helpful advice and always help me to find the solution of the problems in many things and being approachable. Also many thanks go to Dr. Thomas Mair for his companionship, his advice and giving me great encouragement about this work. I am greatly indebted to the very good colleagues and friends who always spent their time to listen my problems and(More)
This thesis consists of three essays in the philosophy of mind. Essay 1 contains an argument against functionalist theories of consciousness. The argument exploits an intuition to the effect that parts of an individual's brain (or of whatever else might realize the individual's mental states, processes, etc.) that are not in use at a time t, can have no(More)
  • 1