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In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature andExpand
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle
In the common agency problem multiple mechanism designer simultaneously attempt to control the behavior of a single privately informed agent. The paper shows that the allocations associated withExpand
Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States
A matching problem is considered in which sellers can publicly commit to a trading price that differs from the price at which buyers expect to trade elsewhere in the market. When demand and supplyExpand
Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices
In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model firstExpand
Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility
This paper considers price competition among firms when there are capacity constraints and buyers have limited ability to visit firms. A natural method of allocating buyers among firms arises in theExpand
Competing Premarital Investments
This paper studies premarital parental investments in children’s wealth, where spousal wealth is a public good in marriage. By investing in their children’s wealth, parents increase the wealth ofExpand
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search
  • Michael Peters
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • 1 December 2000
We show that the distribution of prices offered by sellers in both the exact and rational expectations equilibria converge weakly to the same limit as the number of buyers grows large. Expand
Internet auctions with many traders
We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogeneous good, set reserve prices at their own second-price auctions. Each buyer has private valueExpand
The Gains from Input Trade with Heterogeneous Importers
Trade in intermediate inputs allows firms to reduce their costs of production and thus benefits consumers through lower prices of domestically produced goods. The extent to which firms participate inExpand
Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency
This short paper considers the validity of assuming that principals make their common agent a single take it or leave it contract offer instead of negotiating over the contract in a more complex way. Expand