Michael Maschler

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1 The authors thank R. J. Aumann, C. d’Aspremont, D. Granot, S. Hart, and A. Perea for various comments and suggestions that helped improve this paper. 2 E-mail: sbarbera@cc.uab.es. This author gratefully acknowledges partial support from Spanish Ministry of Education DGICYT Grant PB-98-0870 and Comissionat per a Universitats i Recerca Grant SGR98-62. 3(More)
The reactive bargaining set (Granot [1994]) is the set of outcomes for which no justified objection exists. Here, in a justified objection the objector first watches how the target tries to act (if he has such an option), and then reacts by making a profit and ruining the target's attempt to maintain his share. In this paper we explore properties of the(More)
Spend your time even for only few minutes to read a book. Reading a book will never reduce and waste your time to be useless. Reading, for some people become a need that is to do every day such as spending time for eating. Now, what about you? Do you like to read a book? Now, we will show you a new book enPDFd essays in game theory in honor of michael(More)
We present a simplified model of the evolution of a society which is regulated by a formal unanimity voting procedure. We examine several protocols, which depend on whether admission or expulsion are permissible, and on the order with which they are implemented. Conditions which ensure the existence of pure-strategy perfect equilibrium profiles for some(More)
In an nontransferable utility (NTU) exchange economy with a continuum of agents, the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set, as well as a smaller bargaining set due to Zhou, may fail to converge to competitive outcomes in large nite NTU exchange economies.(More)