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We examine the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of capital structure and find that capital structure is remarkably stable over time; firms with high (low) leverage remain relatively high (low) levered for over 20 years. Additionally, this relative ranking is observed for both public and private firms, and is largely unaffected by the process of(More)
This paper provides large-sample evidence pertaining to the use of and wealth effects associated with provisions for termination fees in merger agreements between 1989 and 1998. The evidence suggests that target termination fee clauses are an efficient contracting device through which target managers compensate bidders for the costs associated with bid(More)
Much of the empirical literature that has examined the functional relationship between firm value and managerial ownership levels assumes that managerial ownership levels are exogenous and are the only component of managerial compensation related to firm performance. This assumption is contrary to the theoretical and empirical literature wherein managerial(More)
In this paper, we develop and test a theoretical model of multi-market trading to explain the differences in the foreign share of trading volume of internationally cross-listed stocks. The model derives an equilibrium which predicts that, under fairly general conditions, the distribution of trading volume across exchanges competing for order flow is related(More)
We use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region's financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms' investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. During the crisis, cumulative stock returns of firms in(More)
We analyze several hundred firms that expand via acquisition and0or increase their number of business segments. The combined market reaction to acquisition announcements is positive but acquiring firm excess values decline after the diversifying event. Much of the excess value reduction occurs because our sample firms acquire already discounted business(More)
In 1992-1993, the SEC required enhanced disclosure on executive compensation and Congress enacted tax legislation, i.e. Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), limiting the deductibility of non-performance related compensation over one million dollars. We examine the effects of these regulatory changes and report small and large sample evidence that many(More)
We investigate the impact of stock-based compensation on managerial ownership. We find that equity compensation succeeds in increasing incentives of lower-ownership managers, but higher-ownership managers negate much of its impact by selling previously owned shares. When executives exercise options to acquire stock, nearly all of the shares are sold. Our(More)
We examine the pecking order hypothesis using a new empirical model and testing strategy. After illustrating how our approach provides a more powerful test relative to earlier attempts, we show that approximately 36% of firms adhere to the pecking order's prediction that firms issue debt before equity. Further investigation reveals that violations of the(More)