Michael L. Lemmon

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We find that the majority of variation in leverage ratios is driven by an unobserved time-invariant effect that generates surprisingly stable capital structures: High (low) levered firms tend to remain as such for over two decades. This feature of leverage is largely unexplained by previously identified determinants, is robust to firm exit, and is present(More)
We analyze several hundred firms that expand via acquisition and0or increase their number of business segments. The combined market reaction to acquisition announcements is positive but acquiring firm excess values decline after the diversifying event. Much of the excess value reduction occurs because our sample firms acquire already discounted business(More)
We use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region’s financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms’ investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. During the crisis, cumulative stock returns of firms in(More)
In 1992-1993, the SEC required enhanced disclosure on executive compensation and Congress enacted tax legislation, i.e. Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), limiting the deductibility of non-performance related compensation over one million dollars. We examine the effects of these regulatory changes and report small and large sample evidence that many(More)
This paper provides large-sample evidence pertaining to the use of and wealth effects associated with provisions for termination fees in merger agreements between 1989 and 1998. The evidence suggests that target termination fee clauses are an efficient contracting device through which target managers compensate bidders for the costs associated with bid(More)
Although research shows that financial development accelerates aggregate economic growth, economists have not resolved conflicting theoretical predictions and ongoing policy disputes about the cross-firm distributional effects of financial development. Using cross-industry, cross-country data, the results are consistent with the view that financial(More)
We investigate the impact of stock-based compensation on managerial ownership. We find that equity compensation succeeds in increasing incentives of lowerownership managers, but higher-ownership managers negate much of its impact by selling previously owned shares. When executives exercise options to acquire stock, nearly all of the shares are sold. Our(More)
We provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects chief executive officer (CEO) pay. We find that the use of benchmarking is widespread and has a significant impact on CEO compensation. One view is that benchmarking is inefficient because it can lead to increases in executive pay not tied to firm performance. A(More)
We find that innovative efficiency (IE), patents or citations scaled by research and development expenditures, is a strong positive predictor of future returns after controlling for firm characteristics and risk. The IE-return relation is associated with the loading on a mispricing factor, and the high Sharpe ratio of the Efficient Minus Inefficient (EMI)(More)
0378-4266/$ see front matter 2010 Elsevier B.V. A doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.02.019 q We thank Doron Avramov, Turan Bali, Antonio Faulkender, Thorsten Hens, Craig Holden, Tim Joh Lando, Michael Lemmon, Igor Lončarski, Christian Lu Mathur (the Editor), Roni Michaely, Vassil Mihov, Ada Trzcinka, Haluk Unal, Josef Zechner, and especially an helpful comments(More)