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Adaptation to other initially unknown agents often requires computing an effective counter-strategy. In the Bayesian paradigm, one must find a good counterstrategy to the inferred posterior of the other agents’ behavior. In the experts paradigm, one may want to choose experts that are good counter-strategies to the other agents’ expected behavior. In this… (More)

Efficient algorithms exist for finding optimal policies in extensive-form games. However, human-scale problems are typically so large that this computation remains infeasible with modern computing resources. State-space abstraction techniques allow for the derivation of a smaller and strategically similar abstract domain, in which an optimal strategy can be… (More)

Poker is a family of games that exhibit imperfect information, where players do not have full knowledge of past events. While many perfect information games have been solved (e.g., Connect-Four and checkers), no nontrivial imperfect information game played competitively by humans has previously been solved. In this paper, we announce that the smallest… (More)

Perfect recall is the common and natural assumption that an agent never forgets. As a consequence, the agent can always condition its choice of action on any prior observations. In this paper, we explore relaxing this assumption. We observe the negative impact this relaxation has on algorithms: some algorithms are no longer well-defined, while others lose… (More)

- Neil Burch, Michael Johanson, Michael H. Bowling
- AAAI
- 2014

Decomposition, i.e., independently analyzing possible subgames, has proven to be an essential principle for effective decision-making in perfect information games. However, in imperfect information games, decomposition has proven to be problematic. To date, all proposed techniques for decomposition in imperfect information games have abandoned theoretical… (More)

- Oskari Tammelin, Neil Burch, Michael Johanson, Michael H. Bowling
- IJCAI
- 2015

Cepheus is the first computer program to essentially solve a game of imperfect information that is played competitively by humans. The game it plays is heads-up limit Texas hold’em poker, a game with over 10 information sets, and a challenge problem for artificial intelligence for over 10 years. Cepheus was trained using a new variant of Counterfactual… (More)

- Michael Johanson, Nolan Bard, Neil Burch, Michael H. Bowling
- AAAI
- 2012

Extensive-form games are a powerful model for representing interactions between agents. Nash equilibrium strategies are a common solution concept for extensive-form games and, in two-player zero-sum games, there are efficient algorithms for calculating such strategies. In large games, this computation may require too much memory and time to be tractable. A… (More)

- Nolan Bard, Michael Johanson, Neil Burch, Michael H. Bowling
- AAMAS
- 2013

The traditional view of agent modelling is to infer the explicit parameters of another agent’s strategy (i.e., their probability of taking each action in each situation). Unfortunately, in complex domains with high dimensional strategy spaces, modelling every parameter often requires a prohibitive number of observations. Furthermore, given a model of such a… (More)

Recently, there has been considerable progress towards algorithms for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies in extensive games. One such algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), has proven to be effective in two-player zero-sum poker domains. While the basic algorithm is iterative and performs a full game traversal on each iteration,… (More)

- Michael Johanson, Michael H. Bowling
- AISTATS
- 2009

The problem of exploiting information about the environment while still being robust to inaccurate or incomplete information arises in many domains. Competitive imperfect information games where the goal is to maximally exploit an unknown opponent’s weaknesses are an example of this problem. Agents for these games must balance two objectives. First, they… (More)