Michael H. Rothkopf

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This paper addresses the existence of market clearing prices and the economic interpretation of strong duality for integer programs in the economic analysis of markets with nonconvexities (indivisibilities). Electric power markets in which nonconvexities arise from the operating characteristics of generators motivate our analysis; however, the results(More)
In this paper, we consider transmission owners that bid capacity, under appropriate Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) market rules, at a positive price into forward and spot (dispatch) auctions to derive congestion revenues. This can encompass daily, monthly, or multimonthly auctions, allowing for commitment of transmission to reflect market needs in(More)
In 1961, in the first published game-theoretic model of auctions, William Vickrey analyzed an unusual auction form, sealed bidding in which the highest bidder wins but the price is set by the bid of the best losing bid. Vickrey argued that bidders in such auctions should bid their true value.1 Thus, the bidder with the highest true value would always win,(More)
A bidder's strategy in one auction may affect his competitors' behavior in subsequent auctions. When this occurs, bidding in a sequence of auctions can be modeled fruitfully as a multistage control process. This paper presents such a model. In it the control is the bidder's strategy, the state characterizes the competitors' behavior and the state transition(More)
Theorists have long believed that Dutch auctions are strategically equivalent to standard sealed bidding. However, recently in controlled experiments with actual Dutch and sealed bid Internet auctions of collectables, the Dutch auctions produced significantly more revenue. We believe that this happened, in part, because the Internet Dutch auctions are a(More)
Despite growing interest in traditional and Internet auctions, the marketing literature on auctions is sparse. This paper outlines selected aspects of the research opportunity. We provide a brief description of the major auction mechanisms, outline key concepts and results from the economic analysis of auctions, and summarize the key findings in empirical(More)