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Foundations of mathematics is the study of the most basic concepts and logical structure of mathematics, with an eye to the unity of human knowledge. Almost all of the problems studied in this book are motivated by an overriding foundational question: What are the appropriate axioms for mathematics? Through a series of case studies, these axioms are(More)
* MICHAEL GLANZBERG Cappelen and Hawthorne's Relativism and Monadic Truth (2009) offers an extended defense of a thesis they call simplicity, which, in brief, holds that propositions are true or false simpliciter. Propositions are cast in their traditional roles as the contents of assertions, and as the semantic values of declarative sentences in contexts.(More)
Here is a simple and inviting picture: the semantic values of sentences, relative to contexts, are sets of possible worlds. These are the truth conditions of assertions of those sentences in contexts. They are thus the contents of assertions, or the objects of attitudes we might take towards such contents. There have been many questions raised about the(More)
About twenty-five years ago, Charles Parsons published a paper that began by asking why we still discuss the Liar Paradox. Today, the question seems all the more apt. In the ensuing years we have seen not only Parsons' work (1974), but seminal work of Saul Kripke (1975), and a huge number of other important papers. Too many to list. Surely, one of them must(More)
The expressions this cat and that glove with a hole in it are complex demonstratives. In this paper, we defend a thesis about complex demonstratives. The thesis we defend concerns the role of the nominal (e.g., cat and glove with a hole) in a central class of uses. In the utterances at issue, we argue, the nominal F in that F plays a policing role: no(More)
My concern in this paper shall be with the idea that truth is in some way relative to a possible world. There is no doubt something right about this sort of slogan, but nonetheless, most of what I have to say about it will be negative. In particular, I shall argue that relativity of truth to a world plays no substantial role in the empirical semantics of(More)