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Repeated games with one-memory
TLDR
We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1-memory strategies, if the action sets are sufficiently rich. Expand
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Sticky matching in school choice
We introduce the notion of sticky-stability in order to accommodate appeal costs in real-life school-choice systems. When appealing is costly, students (or parents) may not find it worth appealing,Expand
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Bounded Memory with Finite Action Spaces∗
This study establishes that the Folk Theorem holds for any 2 player repeated game with (time-independent) limited-memory pure strategies, and with discounting. That is, we prove that any strictlyExpand
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Strategic Behavior in Non-Atomic Games
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal choice, this study proposes a refinement of Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium. Given aExpand
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Bounded memory Folk Theorem
TLDR
We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded-memory bounded memory strategies even when the action sets are finite. Expand
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Epsilon-Nash implementation ☆
This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence to be implementable via epsilon-Nash equilibrium when agents' preferences can be represented by cardinalExpand
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The Optimality of Team Contracts
TLDR
This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. Expand
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Time Dependent Bounded Recall Strategies are Enough to Play the Discounted Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
We show that for any discount factor, there is a natural number $M$ such that all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the discounted repeated prisoners' dilemma can be obtained by subgame perfectExpand
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Aggregate efficiency in random assignment problems
We introduce aggregate e‐ciency (AE) for random assignments (RA) by requiring higher expected numbers of agents be assigned to their more preferred choices. It is shown that the realizations of anyExpand
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