Mayuko Nakamaru

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The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals is studied in a lattice-structured habitat, where individuals interact locally only with their neighbors. The initial population includes Tit-for-Tat (abbreviated as TFT, indicating a cooperative strategy) and All Defect (AD, a selfish strategy) distributed randomly over the lattice points. Each(More)
We analyse the population dynamics of two strains of bacteria (Escherichia coli): one strain produces a toxin (called colicin) that increases the mortality of a colicin-sensitive strain in the neighbourhood, but does not harm the colicin-producing strain itself. On the other hand, in the absence of colicin in the environment, the colicin-sensitive strain(More)
The evolution of cooperation is studied in a lattice-structured population, in which each individual plays the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game with its neighbors. The population includes Tit-for-Tat (TFT, a cooperative strategy) and All Defect (AD, a selfish strategy) distributed over the lattice points. An individual dies randomly, and the vacant site is(More)
The evolution of cooperation is one of the great puzzles in evolutionary biology. Punishment has been suggested as one solution to this problem. Here punishment is generally defined as incurring a cost to inflict harm on a wrong-doer. In the presence of punishers, cooperators can gain higher payoffs than non-cooperators. Therefore cooperation may evolve as(More)
In this paper, we study the spread of social norms, such as rules and customs that are components of human cultures. We consider the spread of two social norms, which are linked through individual behaviors. Spreading social norms depend not only on the social network structure, but also on the learning system. We consider four social network structures:(More)
Punishment is an important mechanism promoting the evolution of altruism among non-relatives. We investigate the coevolution of altruism and punitive behavior, considering four possible strategies: the altruist punisher (AP, a cooperator who punishes defectors), the altruist non-punisher (AN, a pure cooperator), the selfish punisher (SP, a defector who(More)
Producing toxic chemicals to suppress both the growth and survivorship of local competitors is called allelopathy; some strains of the bacteria Escherichia coli produce a toxin (named colicin) which may kill colicin-sensitive neighbors while they themselves are immune. In a previous paper, the competitive outcome between colicin-producing and(More)
Punishing defectors is an important means of stabilizing cooperation. When levels of cooperation and punishment are continuous, individuals must employ suitable social standards for defining defectors and for determining punishment levels. Here we investigate the evolution of a social reaction norm, or psychological response function, for determining the(More)
Environmental threats, such as habitat size reduction or environmental pollution, may not cause immediate extinction of a population but may shorten the expected time to extinction. We developed a method to estimate the mean time to extinction for a density-dependent population with environmental fluctuation and to compare the impacts of different risk(More)
Individuals tend to conform their behavior to that of the majority. Consequently, an individual's behavior is not always consistent with his or her attitude, and such inconsistency sometimes causes mental distress. Understanding the mechanism of sustaining inconsistency between attitude and behavior is a challenging problem from the viewpoint of(More)