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The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals is studied in a lattice-structured habitat, where individuals interact locally only with their neighbors. The initial population includes Tit-for-Tat (abbreviated as TFT, indicating a cooperative strategy) and All Defect (AD, a selfish strategy) distributed randomly over the lattice points. Each(More)
The evolution of cooperation is studied in a lattice-structured population, in which each individual plays the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game with its neighbors. The population includes Tit-for-Tat (TFT, a cooperative strategy) and All Defect (AD, a selfish strategy) distributed over the lattice points. An individual dies randomly, and the vacant site is(More)
Punishment is an important mechanism promoting the evolution of altruism among non-relatives. We investigate the coevolution of altruism and punitive behavior, considering four possible strategies: the altruist punisher (AP, a cooperator who punishes defectors), the altruist non-punisher (AN, a pure cooperator), the selfish punisher (SP, a defector who(More)
The evolution of cooperation is one of the great puzzles in evolutionary biology. Punishment has been suggested as one solution to this problem. Here punishment is generally defined as incurring a cost to inflict harm on a wrong-doer. In the presence of punishers, cooperators can gain higher payoffs than non-cooperators. Therefore cooperation may evolve as(More)
Producing toxic chemicals to suppress both the growth and survivorship of local competitors is called allelopathy; some strains of the bacteria Escherichia coli produce a toxin (named colicin) which may kill colicin-sensitive neighbors while they themselves are immune. In a previous paper, the competitive outcome between colicin-producing and(More)
Punishing defectors is an important means of stabilizing cooperation. When levels of cooperation and punishment are continuous, individuals must employ suitable social standards for defining defectors and for determining punishment levels. Here we investigate the evolution of a social reaction norm, or psychological response function, for determining the(More)
In this paper, we study the spread of social norms, such as rules and customs that are components of human cultures. We consider the spread of two social norms, which are linked through individual behaviors. Spreading social norms depend not only on the social network structure, but also on the learning system. We consider four social network structures:(More)
Cooperation and spiteful behavior are still evolutionary puzzles. Costly punishment, for which the game payoff is the same as that of spiteful behavior, is one mechanism for promoting the evolution of cooperation. A spatially structured population facilitates the evolution of either cooperation or spite/punishment if cooperation is linked explicitly or(More)
In the human sciences, cultural evolution is often viewed as an autonomous process essentially free of genetic influence. A question that follows is, If culture is not influenced by genes, can it take any path? Employing a simple mathematical model of cultural transmission in which individuals may copy each other's traits, it can be shown that cultural(More)
What should an individual do if there are no reliable cues to the strength of a competitor when fighting with it for resources? We herein examine the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the hawk-dove game, if the opponent's resource-holding potential (RHP) can only indirectly be inferred from the outcome of past interactions in the population. The(More)