Mauricio Soares Bugarin

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We examine voluntary disclosures of information about corporate strategies. We develop a model in which managers choose whether to reveal their strategic plans only to some partners of the firm or also to the outside world. We show that managers face a tradeoff when deciding whether to disclose their private information to outsiders. On the one hand, by(More)
The present paper ooers a rational choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the(More)
We extend Armstrong’s [2] result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models in two key ways, providing support for the view that this result holds true in a large class of models and is applicable to many different markets. First, we relax the strong technical assumptions he imposed on preferences and consumer types. Second, we extend the result(More)
This article studies strategic behavior in municipal health care consortia where neighboring municipalities form a partnership to supply high-complexity health care. Each municipality partially funds the organization. Depending on the partnership contract, a free rider problem may jeopardize the organization. A municipality will default its payments if it(More)
Three hypotheses exist for the bimodal, cross-country, income distributions emerging in the data since 1960 and dubbed convergence clubs. One is that economies in each mode are interacting with one another – true clubs. A second is that the bimodality is caused by lock-in or ‘true contagion’ – success at innovations breeds further success, failure breeds(More)
This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ̄rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy,(More)
We extend Armstrong’s [2] result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models in two key ways, providing support for the view that this result is generic and applicable to many different markets. First, we relax the strong technical assumptions he imposed on preferences and consumer types. Second, we extend the result beyond the monopolistic market(More)
While regulated firms tend to exaggerate their inability to reduce costs to influence the rates they are allowed to charge, firms that quote in the stock market tend to exaggerate their ability to reduce costs in order to increase the price at which their stock is traded. This suggests to us that there may be gains from incorporating stock market reactions(More)