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An open puzzle for climate-policy analysis is how policies could be made sensitive to climate change impacts spanning over centuries while keeping the shorter-term macroeconomic policies connected to the descriptive facts. We develop a tractable general-equilibrium model for climate-economy interactions with time-declining pure discounting. The model(More)
We consider per-capita carbon dioxide emission trends in 16 early developed countries over the period 1870-2028. Using a multiple-break time series method we find more evidence for very early downturns in per-capita trends than for late downturns, during the oil price shocks of the 1970s. Only for two countries do downturns in trends imply downward sloping(More)
Economic growth over the coming centuries is one of the major determinants of today's optimal greenhouse gas mitigation policy. At the same time, long-run economic growth is highly uncertain. This paper is the first to evaluate optimal mitigation policy under long-term growth uncertainty in a stochastic integrated assessment model of climate change. The(More)
Motivated by the structure of existing pollution permit markets, we study the equilibrium path that results from allocating an initial stock of storable permits to an agent, or a group of agents, in a position to exercise market power. A large seller of permits exercises market power no differently than a large supplier of an exhaustible resource. However,(More)
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Summary We consider a situation where an exhaustible-resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a perfect substitute but there is a time-to-build delay for the substitute. We that find in this simple framework the basic implications of the Hotelling model (1931) are(More)
In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on the equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and a competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution(More)
It has been long recognized that an exhaustible-resource monopsonist faces a commitment problem similar to that of a durable-good monopolist. Indeed, Hörner and Kamien (2004) demonstrate that the two problems are formally equivalent under full commitment. We show that there is no such equivalence in the absence of commitment. The existence of a choke price(More)
Should public assets such as infrastructure, education, and the environment earn the same return as private investments? We consider if time-inconsistent decision-makers can gain from institutions that enforce cost-benefit rules on large projects that influence the economy as a whole. Long-term public investments provide commitment to current preferences,(More)