Matthijs van Veelen

Learn More
Group selection theory has a history of controversy. After a period of being in disrepute, models of group selection have regained some ground, but not without a renewed debate over their importance as a theoretical tool. In this paper I offer a simple framework for models of the evolution of altruism and cooperation that allows us to see how and to what(More)
This study determined which types of laparoscopic instruments are most often used in Europe, why they are being used, and what problems exist while using the instruments. The handles were also evaluated according to ergonomic design criteria. A questionnaire was send to 62 experienced surgeons in 19 countries. The laparoscopic instruments were divided into(More)
It is often suggested that any group selection model can be recast in terms of inclusive fitness. A standard reference to support that claim is "'Quantitative genetics, inclusive fitness, and group selection" by Queller (1992) in the American Naturalist 139 (3), 540-558. In that paper the Price equation is used for the derivation of this claim. Instead of a(More)
We analyse simulations reported in "The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions" by Bowles et al., 2003 in the Journal of Theoretical Biology 223, 135-147, and begin with distinguishing two types of group selection models. The literature does not provide different names for them, but they are shown to be fundamentally different and have(More)
Reciprocity and repeated games have been at the center of attention when studying the evolution of human cooperation. Direct reciprocity is considered to be a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, and it is generally assumed that it can lead to high levels of cooperation. Here we explore an open-ended, infinite strategy space, where every(More)
In multi-player games n individuals interact in any one encounter and derive a payoff from that interaction. We assume that individuals adopt one of two strategies, and we consider symmetric games, which means the payoff depends only on the number of players using either strategy, but not on any particular configuration of the encounter. On the cycle we(More)
The well-known replicator dynamics is usually applied to 2-player games and random matching. Here we allow for games with n players, and for population structures other than random matching. This more general application leads to a version of the replicator dynamics of which the standard 2-player, well-mixed version is a special case, and which allows us to(More)
Natural selection works against cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. These mechanisms are typically studied in isolation. Here we look at the interaction between two such mechanisms: tag recognition and population structure. If cooperators can recognize each other, and only cooperate among themselves, then they can invade defectors. This is(More)
Fitness is the central concept in evolutionary theory. It measures a phenotype's ability to survive and reproduce. There are different ways to represent this measure: Malthusian fitness and Wrightian fitness. One can go back and forth between the two, but when we characterize model properties or interpret data, it can be important to distinguish between(More)
Why are numerous reactions to the Nowak et al. paper so ferocious? And how is it possible that theorists even seem to disagree about mathematics? An important key to the heatedness of the debate is that many theory papers on the evolution of cooperation use the Price equation. This is regularly treated as if its generality makes it the E = mc of population(More)