Matthias Lang

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We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic(More)
BACKGROUND There is a current interest in local anaesthetic drugs/formulations exhibiting long durations of sensory block and minor motor-blocking effects. OBJECTIVES To compare the duration of sensory and motor blockade in peripheral nerve blocks induced by the new agents ropivacaine and levobupivacaine, with that of racemic bupivacaine and pethidine. (More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy. The credible announcement of thoroughly auditing claim reports is a powerful(More)
(2015) Heisenberg-limited metrology with information recycling. This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published(More)
This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in the framework of a continuous time contest. Formally, we analyze a dynamic game in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brow-nian Motion with drift. Only the player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. We derive a closed-form solution for the unique(More)
Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this benefit. Studying the trade-off between screening and moral hazard, the paper characterizes optimal mechanisms. Popular all-or-nothing(More)
I study the optimal audit mechanism when the principal cannot commit to an audit strategy. Invoking a revelation principle, the agent reports her type to a mediator who assigns contracts and recommends the principal whether to audit. For each reported type the mediator random-izes over a base-contract and the audit contract, accompanied by a recommendation(More)
BACKGROUND Surgical management of renal secondary hyperparathyroidism (sHPT) is varying. Total parathyroidectomy with heterotopic autotransplantation (TPTX + AT) is one of the standard surgical procedures in sHPT, but there is no consensus about the optimal site for graft insertion. At the surgical department of the University Hospital of Heidelberg we(More)
We develop a novel theory of real estate foreclosure auctions, which have the special feature that the lender acts as a seller for low and as a buyer for high prices. The theory yields several empirically testable predictions concerning the strategic behavior of the agents, both under symmetric and asymmetric information. Using novel data from Palm Beach(More)