Matthew Stephenson

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I present a model of interactions between voters, a government, and a terrorist organization+ The model focuses on a previously unexplored conceptualiza-tion of counterterrorism as divided into tactic-specific observable and general unobservable tactics+ When there is divergence between voters and government preferences, strategic substitution among(More)
This article theorizes and empirically tests the conditions under which organizations' symbolic commitments to self-regulate are particularly likely to result in improved compliance practices and outcomes. We argue that the legal environment, particularly as it is constructed by the enforcement activities of regulators, significantly influences the(More)
W e develop an informational model of judicial decision-making in which deference to precedent is useful to policy-oriented appellate judges because it improves the accuracy with which they can communicate legal rules to trial judges. Our simple model yields new implications and hypotheses regarding conditions under which judges will maintain or break with(More)
M ost economic theory presumes— often implicitly—a system of law and adjudication. After all, institutions like property, contract, and government regulation typically entail mechanisms for law-creation and law-application, which usually (though perhaps not inevitably) imply some kind of judicial system (Posner, 2008, pp. 5– 6). Because judges are often(More)
In many settings, human beings are boundedly rational. A distinctive and insufficiently explored legal response to bounded rationality is to attempt to debias through law by steering people in more rational directions. In many domains, existing legal analyses emphasize the alternative approach of insulating outcomes from the effects of boundedly rational(More)
R egulatory agencies impose costs and benefits tailored to individual firms through their discre-tionary enforcement activities. We propose that corporations use political expenditures in part to " flex their muscles " to regulators and convey their willingness to fight an agency's specific determinations in the political arena. Because the signaling(More)
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. Administrative agencies are increasingly establishing voluntary self-reporting programs both as an investigative tool and(More)
An independent judiciary with the power to constrain the executive and legislative branches is commonly thought to be the foundation of government under the rule of law. However, it is not obvious why those with political power would ever tolerate the constraints imposed by an independent court. I o¤er an explanation for independent judicial review that is(More)