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If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for(More)
Approval Voting is analyzed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: the Myerson’s Large Poisson Games. We first establish the Magnitude Equivalence Theorem which substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes of the pivot outcomes. Furthermore, we show that the Condorcet Winner need not be the Winner of the election in(More)
This work provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominance solvability of approval voting games. Our conditions are very simple since they are based on the approval relation, a binary relation between the alternatives. We distinguish between two sorts of dominance solvability and prove that the most stringent one leads to the election of the(More)
Using calculations from first principles and the concept of layer polarization, we have elucidated the nanoscale organization and local polarization in ferroelectric thin films between metallic contacts. The profile of the local polarization for different film thicknesses unveils a peculiar spatial pattern of atomic layers with uncompensated dipoles in what(More)
We show that Approval Voting need not trigger sincere behavior in equilibrium of Poisson voting games and hence might lead a strategic voter to skip a candidate preferred to her worst preferred approved candidate. We identify two main rationales for these violations of sincerity. First, if a candidate has no votes, a voter might skip him. Notwithstanding,(More)
We consider spatial competition when consumers are arbitrarily distributed on a compact metric space. Retailers can choose one of finitely many locations in this space. We focus on symmetric mixed equilibria which exist for any number of retailers. We prove that the distribution of retailers tends to agree with the distribution of the consumers when the(More)
In this paper, new results are provided in the Poisson-Myerson framework. These results are shown to be helpful in the study of approval voting. Indeed, the Magnitude Equivalence Theorem (MET) substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes of pivotal events. An example is provided that contrasts with Laslier (2004) results concerning(More)