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One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contribu tions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-w orld settings. We show that the decl ine of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for im perfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than oth ers, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contr(More)
Acknowledgements: We thank two anonymous referees and the editor for their suggestions. We also thank Abstract A growing number of field and experimental studies in social dilemma settings focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and(More)
This paper reports an experiment comparing three stag hunt games that have the same best-response correspondence and the same expected payoff from the mixed equilibrium, but differ in the incentive to play a best response rather than an inferior response. In each game, risk dominance conflicts with payoff dominance and selects an inefficient pure strategy(More)
We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information about the returns from contributing In contrast the ability to lead-by-example has no effect on total(More)
We examine contributions to a public good when some donors do not know the true value of the good. If donors in such an environment determine the sequence of moves, two contribution orders may arise as equilibria. Either the uninformed and informed donors contribute simultaneously or the informed contribute prior to the uninformed. Sequential moves result(More)
We investigate the effect of non-binding pre-play communication in experiments with simple two-player coordination games. We reproduce the results of other studies in which play converges to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium in the absence of communication, and communication moves outcomes in the direction of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. However, we(More)
We compare, experimentally, the Vickrey auction and an ascending-price auction recently introduced by Ausubel (1997). We evaluate the relative performance of both auctions in terms of efficiency and revenue in multi-unit environments where valuations either have a common-value component or are private information. We find that the Ausubel auction is less(More)
Voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time. We use a two-stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior. Using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions: contributions in stage 2 are 45 percent lower than in stage(More)
Price comparison sites have become an increasingly popular way to shop online. Yet, even though consumers have complete access to the list of prices for apparently identical products offered on these sites, persistent price dispersion has been widely observed. One important theoretical explanation for this phenomenon comes from clearinghouse models of price(More)