Martin Sefton

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Experiments have shown that punishment enhances socially beneficial cooperation but that the costs of punishment outweigh the gains from cooperation. This challenges evolutionary models of altruistic cooperation and punishment, which predict that punishment will be beneficial. We compared 10- and 50-period cooperation experiments. With the longer time(More)
One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contribu tions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-w orld settings. We show that the decl ine of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for im perfect conditional cooperation. Many people’s desire to contribute less than oth ers, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contr(More)
A growing number of field and experimental studies in social dilemma settings focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. This(More)
We investigate the effect of non-binding pre-play communication in experiments with simple two-player coordination games. We reproduce the results of other studies in which play converges to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium in the absence of communication, and communication moves outcomes in the direction of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. However, we(More)
The cell adhesion molecule, uvomorulin, is synthesised in both the 135 x 10(3) M(r) precursor and 120 x 10(3) M(r) mature forms on maternal mRNA templates in unfertilized and newly fertilized mouse oocytes. Synthesis on maternal message ceases during the 2-cell stage to resume later on mRNA encoded presumptively by the embryonic genome. Uvomorulin is(More)
We examine contributions to a public good when some donors do not know the true value of the good. If donors in such an environment determine the sequence of moves, two contribution orders may arise as equilibria. Either the uninformed and informed donors contribute simultaneously or the informed contribute prior to the uninformed. Sequential moves result(More)
We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information about the returns from contributing (Hermalin, 1998, Vesterlund, 2003). In contrast the ability to(More)
This paper presents theory and experiments to investigate how network architecture influences route-choice behavior. We consider changes to networks that, theoretically, exhibit the PigouKnight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes. We show that these paradoxes are specific examples of more general classes of network change properties that we term the “least(More)