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Voting schemes that provide receipt-freeness prevent voters from proving their cast vote, and hence thwart vote-buying and coer-cion. We analyze the security of the multi-authority voting protocol of Benaloh and Tuinstra and demonstrate that this protocol is not receipt-free, opposed to what was claimed in the paper and was believed before. Furthermore, we… (More)

We consider veriiable secret sharing (VSS) and multiparty computation (MPC) in the secure-channels model, where a broadcast channel is given and a non-zero error probability is allowed. In this model Rabin and Ben-Or proposed VSS and MPC protocols secure against an adversary that can corrupt any minority of the players. In this paper, we rst observe that a… (More)

The classical results in unconditional multi-party computation among a set of n players state that less than n/2 passive or Iess than n/3 active adversaries can be tolerated; assuming a broadcast channel the threshold for active adversaries is ta/2. Strictly generalizing these results we specify the set of potential y misbehaving players as an arbitrary set… (More)

- J, Stefan Wolf, Prof, Ivan Damgård, Don Beaver, Hugue Blier +50 others
- 2006

2007 ii Acknowledgments First of all, I would like to thank Stefan Wolf who has been a great advisor. Many results in this thesis are the outcome of endless discussions with him. I also want to thank Ivan Damgård for co-refereeing this thesis. I would also like to thank all the people I was able to work with or talk to about my research during the last few… (More)

Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of n players to securely compute an agreed function of their inputs, even when up to t players are under the control of an adversary. Known asyn-chronous MPC protocols require communication of at least Ω(n 3) (with cryptographic security), respectively Ω(n 4) (with information-theoretic security, but with… (More)

The goal of secure multiparty computation is to transform a given protocol involving a trusted party into a protocol without need for the trusted party, by simulating the party among the players. Indeed, by the same means, one can simulate an arbitrary player in any given protocol. We formally define what it means to simulate a player by a multiparty… (More)

We present a very efficient multi-party computation protocol unconditionally secure against an active adversary. The security is maximal, i.e., active corruption of up to t < n/3 of the n players is tolerated. The communication complexity for securely evaluating a circuit with m multiplication gates over a finite field is O(mn 2) field elements, including… (More)

Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of n players to securely compute an agreed function of their inputs, even when up to t players are under the control of an (active or passive) adversary. In the information-theoretic model MPC is possible if and only if t < n/2 (where active security with t ≥ n/3 requires a trusted key setup). Known passive… (More)

All known protocols for Byzantine agreement (BA) among <i>n</i> players require the message to be communicated at least Ω(<i>n</i><sup>2</sup>) times, which results in an overall communication complexity of at least Ω(<i>l</i><i>n</i><sup>2</sup>) bits for an <i>l</i>-bit message. We present the first BA protocol in which the message is… (More)

This paper improves on the classical results in unconditionally secure multi-party computation among a set of n players, by considering a model with three simultaneously occurring types of player corruption: the adversary can actively corrupt (i.e. take full control over) up to ta players and, additionally, can passively corrupt (i.e. read the entire… (More)