Learn More
[I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously can't know a priori that the external world exists, you also can't know a priori that you are in the mental state(More)
Anosognosia is a patient's denial of his or her impairment or illness. The starting point for this chapter is that anosognosia can be considered as a delusion. We sketch the two-factor framework for understanding delusions and how anosognosia would fit into this framework. We set out competing views on the role of motivation in anosognosia and evaluate the(More)
A new rubber hand paradigm evokes an illusion with three conceptually distinct components: (i) the participant experiences her/his hidden right hand as administering touch at the location of the examiner's viewed administering hand (visual capture of action); (ii) the participant experiences the examiner's administering hand as being the participant's own(More)
A simple experimental paradigm creates the powerful illusion that one is touching one's own hand even when the two hands are separated by 15 cm. The participant uses her right hand to administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner provides identical stimulation to the participant's receptive left hand. Change in felt position of the(More)
The nonvisual self-touch rubber hand paradigm elicits the compelling illusion that one is touching one's own hand even though the two hands are not in contact. In four experiments, we investigated spatial limits of distance (15 cm, 30 cm, 45 cm, 60 cm) and alignment (0°, 90° anti-clockwise) on the nonvisual self-touch illusion and the well-known visual(More)
Among theory theorists, it is commonly thought that folk psychological theory is tacitly known. However, folk psychological knowledge has none of the central features of tacit knowledge. But if it is ordinary knowledge, why is it that we have difficulties expressing anything but a handful of folk psychological generalisations? The reason is that our(More)
Motion-induced blindness (MIB), the illusory disappearance of local targets against a moving mask, has been attributed to both low-level stimulus-based effects and high-level processes, involving selection between local and more global stimulus contexts. Prior work shows that MIB is modulated by binocular disparity-based depth-ordering cues. We assessed(More)