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- Michael Burrows, Martín Abadi, Roger M. Needham
- SOSP
- 1989

Authentication protocols are the basis of security in many distributed systems, and it is therefore essential to ensure that these protocols function correctly. Unfortunately, their design has been extremely error prone. Most of the protocols found in the literature contain redundancies or security flaws. A simple logic has allowed us to describe the… (More)

- Martín Abadi, Ashish Agarwal, +37 authors Xiaoqiang Zheng
- ArXiv
- 2015

Martı́n Abadi, Ashish Agarwal, Paul Barham, Eugene Brevdo, Zhifeng Chen, Craig Citro, Greg S. Corrado, Andy Davis, Jeffrey Dean, Matthieu Devin, Sanjay Ghemawat, Ian Goodfellow, Andrew Harp, Geoffrey Irving, Michael Isard, Yangqing Jia, Rafal Jozefowicz, Lukasz Kaiser, Manjunath Kudlur, Josh Levenberg, Dan Mané, Rajat Monga, Sherry Moore, Derek Murray,… (More)

- Martín Abadi, Luca Cardelli
- Monographs in Computer Science
- 1996

types (CLU, etc.). (Impredicative existentials types.) Modules (Modula 2, etc.). (Predicative dependent types.) Objects and subtyping (Simula 67, etc.). (Subtyping + ???) • The first three innovations are now largely understood, in isolation, both theoretically and practically. Some of their combinations are also well understood. • There has been little… (More)

- Martín Abadi, Mihai Budiu, Úlfar Erlingsson, Jay Ligatti
- ACM Conference on Computer and Communications…
- 2005

Current software attacks often build on exploits that subvert machine-code execution. The enforcement of a basic safety property, Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), can prevent such attacks from arbitrarily controlling program behavior. CFI enforcement is simple, and its guarantees can be established formally even with respect to powerful adversaries. Moreover,… (More)

- Martín Abadi, Andrew D. Gordon
- ACM Conference on Computer and Communications…
- 1997

We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for describing and analyzing cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols; the spi calculus enables us to consider cryptographic issues in more… (More)

- Martín Abadi, Cédric Fournet
- POPL
- 2001

We study the interaction of the "new" construct with a rich but common form of (first-order) communication. This interaction is crucial in security protocols, which are the main motivating examples for our work; it also appears in other programming-language contexts. Specifically, we introduce a simple, general extension of the pi calculus with value… (More)

- Martín Abadi, Phillip Rogaway
- Journal of Cryptology
- 2000

Two distinct, rigorous views of cryptography have developed over the years, in two mostly separate communities. One of the views relies on a simple but effective formal approach; the other, on a detailed computational model that considers issues of complexity and probability. There is an uncomfortable and interesting gap between these two approaches to… (More)

- Martín Abadi, Leslie Lamport
- [1988] Proceedings. Third Annual Information…
- 1988

Refinement mappings are used to prove that a lower-level specification correctly implements a higher-level one. The authors consider specifications consisting of a state machine (which may be infinite-state) that specifies safety requirements and an arbitrary supplementary property that specifies liveness requirements. A refinement mapping from a… (More)

- Martín Abadi, Mihai Budiu, Úlfar Erlingsson, Jay Ligatti
- ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.
- 2009

Current software attacks often build on exploits that subvert machine-code execution. The enforcement of a basic safety property, control-flow integrity (CFI), can prevent such attacks from arbitrarily controlling program behavior. CFI enforcement is simple and its guarantees can be established formally, even with respect to powerful adversaries. Moreover,… (More)

- Martín Abadi, Roger M. Needham
- IEEE Trans. Software Eng.
- 1994

We present principles for the design of cryptographic protocols. The principles are neither necessary nor sufficient for correctness. They are however helpful, in that adherence to them would have avoided a considerable number of published errors. Our principles are informal guidelines. They complement formal methods, but do not assume them. In order to… (More)