Mark Phelan

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Recent experimental research on the ' Knobe effect ' suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that there is a bi-directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative considerations. We defend a novel account of this phenomenon that exploits two factors: (i) an intuitive asymmetry in judgments of responsibility (e.g. praise/blame) and (ii)(More)
How do people ordinarily attribute mental states to other entities? Clearly, people take physical features into account when assessing whether an organism is likely to occupy particular mental states. An eyeless cave fish, for instance, will be thought unlikely to occupy visual states. However according to one recent theory, people use information about(More)
Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state's phenomenological character, but rather by its(More)
AIM Although models of family intervention are clearly articulated in the child and early adolescent literature, there is less clarity regarding family intervention approaches in later adolescence and emerging adulthood. METHODS This study provides the rationale and intervention framework for a developmentally sensitive model of time-limited family work(More)
BACKGROUND The aim of the Youth Depression Alleviation-Combined Treatment (YoDA-C) study is to determine whether antidepressant medication should be started as a first-line treatment for youth depression delivered concurrently with psychotherapy. Doubts about the use of medication have been raised by meta-analyses in which the efficacy and safety of(More)
OBJECTIVES There is a lack of clear guidance regarding the management of ongoing suicidality in young people experiencing major depressive disorder. This study utilised an expert consensus approach in identifying practice principles to complement relevant clinical guidelines for the treatment of major depressive disorder in young people. The study also(More)
Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Recently, Sytsma and Machery (2010) have challenged this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non‐ philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state's(More)
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