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Fiscal governance in Europe
This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of
Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom
This paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital, using the analogy of a “tournament” as a substitute for the ”race-to-the-bottom” model. Our key insight is that
Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries
Recent scholarship on the impact of fiscal institutions on budgeting outcomes in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries indicates that political institutions impact the level of budget
Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics: Capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate
Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions
I argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions: party veto players and subnational governments, which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems.
Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU
We investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of Eurozone countries. Deficits significantly
Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact clearly failed to prevent the euro crisis. We contend that the failure was due largely to the ability of the Member States to undermine the Pact’s operation. The
Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union
A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are" likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter because" they