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Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach(More)
The development of pet robots, toy robots, and sex robots suggests a near-future scenario of habitual living with 'personal' robots. How should we evaluate their potential impact on the quality of our lives and existence? In this paper, I argue for an approach to ethics of personal robots that advocates a methodological turn from robots to humans, from mind(More)
This paper argues that our understanding of many human-robot relations can be enhanced by comparisons with human-animal relations and by a phenomenological approach which highlights the significance of how robots appear to humans. Some potential gains of this approach are explored by discussing the concept of alterity, diversity and change in human-robot(More)
The use of robots in therapy for children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) raises issues concerning the ethical and social acceptability of this technology and, more generally, about human-robot interaction. However, usually philosophical papers on the ethics of human-robot-interaction do not take into account stakeholders' views; yet it is important to(More)
Information systems (IS) as a field of academic research and business practice has long considered the importance of ethical considerations, including questions of what counts as right and wrong, good or bad, moral or immoral. IS also theoretically reflects on why particular acts or rules may be considered moral or immoral. Such questions touch on the(More)
Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach is not only a helpful approach to development problems but can also be employed as a general ethical-anthropological framework in ‘advanced’ societies. This paper explores its normative force for evaluating information technologies, with a particular focus on the issue of human enhancement. It suggests that the(More)
The standard response to engineering disasters like the Deepwater Horizon case is to ascribe full moral responsibility to individuals and to collectives treated as individuals. However, this approach is inappropriate since concrete action and experience in engineering contexts seldom meets the criteria of our traditional moral theories. Technological action(More)