Marina Núñez

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The existence of von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions (stable sets) for bilateral assignment markets is an unsolved question since Shapley and Shubik (1972). In 1984 Shubik proposed to consider, for each optimal matching, the union of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with this matching. We prove in the present paper that(More)
Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set of extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his(More)
Individuals with HIV infection and two apolipoprotein L1 gene (APOL1) risk variants frequently develop nephropathy. Here we tested whether non-HIV viral infections influence nephropathy risk via interactions with APOL1 by assessing APOL1 genotypes and presence of urine JC and BK polyoma virus and plasma HHV6 and CMV by quantitative polymerase chain(More)
BACKGROUND Hepatitis B coinfection is common in HIV-positive individuals and as antiretroviral therapy has made death due to AIDS less common, hepatitis has become increasingly important. Several drugs are available to treat hepatitis B. The most potent and the one with the lowest risk of resistance appears to be tenofovir (TDF). However there are several(More)