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This paper focuses on sharing the costs and revenues of maintaining a public network communication structure. Revenues are assumed to be bilateral and communication links are publicly available but costly. It is assumed that agents are located at the vertices of an undirected graph in which the edges represent all possible communication links. We take the… (More)
In this paper, we characterise the compromise value of a game as the barycentre of the edges of its core cover. For this, we introduce the τ * value, which extends the adjusted proportional rule for bankruptcy situations and coincides with the compromise value on a large class of games.
In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games). Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems. Also the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized. The relation between core… (More)