Marie-Laure Allain

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We report results from an experiment on two-unit sequential auctions with and without a buyer’s option (which allows the winner of the first auction to buy the second unit). The 4 main auction institutions are studied. Observed bidding behavior is close to Nash equilibrium bidding in the auctions for the second unit, but not in the auctions for the first(More)
This paper shows that retailers may choose to offer products differentiated in quality, not to relax downstream competition, but to improve their buyer power in the negotiation with their supplier. We consider a simple vertical industry where two producers sell products differentiated in quality to two retailers who operate in separated markets. In the(More)
This paper explores the indirect inflationary mechanism allowed by loss leaders banning laws. In a model where a monopolist producer sells his product through vertically separated and differentiated retailers, we show that the ban of resale at a loss can be used strategically by the producer to increase his wholesale price and pay the retailers through(More)
This paper explores the indirect inflationary mechanism allowed by loss leaders banning laws. In a model where a monopolist producer sells his product through vertically separated and differentiated retailers, we show that the ban of resale at a loss can be used strategically by the producer to increase his wholesale price and pay the retailers through(More)
This paper explores the indirect inflationary mechanism allowed by loss leaders banning laws. In a double duopoly model where producers compete to sell differentiated products through differentiated retailers, we show that the ban of resale at a loss can be pro-collusive : colluding producers can use this rule strategically to set higher wholesale prices,(More)
We examine the impact of horizontal and vertical market structure on innovation and product variety. We consider a market for a homogeneous good where it is possible to innovate to launch a new substitute product. The cost of launching the new product is fixed and spread between the manufacturing and the retail industries. We show that a vertically(More)
The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of competition policy. We provide an analysis of static and dynamic frameworks to characterize the restitution and deterrence properties of fines: cartel stability depends on their ability to prevent deviation by firms, while the benefit of a deviation(More)