Maria Polukarov

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In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among(More)
Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources, are central to AI. In such situations, agents’ individual preferences over available alternatives may vary, and they may try to reconcile these differences by voting. Based on the fact that agents may have incentives to vote(More)
The coordination of emergency responders and robots to undertake a number of tasks in disaster scenarios is a grand challenge for multi-agent systems. Central to this endeavour is the problem of forming the best teams (coalitions) of responders to perform the various tasks in the area where the disaster has struck. Moreover, these teams may have to form,(More)
We give the analysis of the computational complexity of coalition structure generation over graphs. Given an undirected graph G = (N,E) and a valuation function v : P(N)→ R over the subsets of nodes, the problem is to find a partition of N into connected subsets, that maximises the sum of the components’ values. This problem is generally NP–complete; in(More)
Emergency responders are faced with a number of significant challenges when managing major disasters. First, the number of rescue tasks posed is usually larger than the number of responders (or agents) and the resources available to them. Second, each task is likely to require a different level of effort in order to be completed by its deadline. Third, new(More)
Congestion games—in which players strategically choose from a set of “resources” and derive utilities that depend on the congestion on each resource— are important in a wide range of applications. However, to date, such games have been constrained to use utility functions that are linear sums with respect to resources. To remove this restriction, this paper(More)
We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in integer–splittable weighted congestion games (ISWCGs), where agents can strategically assign different amounts of demand to different resources, but must distribute this demand in fixed-size parts. Such scenarios arise in a wide range of application domains, including job scheduling and(More)
We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium [5]. We assume that players in a strategic game are embedded in a social network, and there are coordination constraints(More)
We give the first analysis of the computational complexity of coalition structure generation over graphs. Given an undirected graph G = (N,E) and a valuation function v : 2 → R over the subsets of nodes, the problem is to find a partition of N into connected subsets, that maximises the sum of the components’ values. This problem is generally NP–complete; in(More)