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- Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings
- J. Artif. Intell. Res.
- 2010

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among… (More)

The coordination of emergency responders and robots to undertake a number of tasks in disaster scenarios is a grand challenge for multi-agent systems. Central to this endeavour is the problem of forming the best teams (coalitions) of responders to perform the various tasks in the area where the disaster has struck. Moreover, these teams may have to form,… (More)

Emergency responders are faced with a number of significant challenges when managing major disasters. First, the number of rescue tasks posed is usually larger than the number of responders (or agents) and the resources available to them. Second, each task is likely to require a different level of effort in order to be completed by its deadline. Third, new… (More)

Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources , are central to AI. In such situations, agents' individual preferences over available alternatives may vary, and they may try to reconcile these differences by voting. Based on the fact that agents may have incentives to vote… (More)

- Thomas Voice, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings
- J. Artif. Intell. Res.
- 2012

We give the analysis of the computational complexity of coalition structure generation over graphs. Given an undirected graph G = (N, E) and a valuation function v : P(N) → R over the subsets of nodes, the problem is to find a partition of N into connected subsets, that maximises the sum of the components' values. This problem is generally NP–complete; in… (More)

- Andrew Byde, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings
- SAGT
- 2009

In this paper we present a new combinatorial problem, called minmax multidimensional knapsack problem (MKP), motivated by a military logistics problem. The logistics problem is a two-period, two-level, chance-constrained problem with recourse. We show that the MKP is NP-hard and develop a practically efficient combinatorial algorithm for solving it. We also… (More)

- Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet, Maria Polukarov
- SAGT
- 2013

We consider a voting setting where candidates have preferences about the outcome of the election and are free to join or leave the election. The corresponding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate or not, has been studied by Dutta et al. [6], who showed that no non-dictatorial voting procedure satisfying unanimity is… (More)

We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in integer–splittable weighted congestion games (ISWCGs), where agents can strategically assign different amounts of demand to different resources, but must distribute this demand in fixed-size parts. Such scenarios arise in a wide range of application domains, including job scheduling and… (More)

We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs), which generalizes the well-known class of congestion games, by incorporating the issue of resource failures into congestion games. In a CGLF, agents share a common set of resources, where each resource has a cost and a probability of failure. Each agent chooses a subset… (More)