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Higher-order evidence and the limits of defeat
Recent authors have drawn attention to a kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of aExpand
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Knowledge and Objective Chance
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Single premise deduction and risk
It is tempting to think that multi premise closure creates a special class of paradoxes having to do with the accumulation of risks, and that these paradoxes could be escaped by rejecting theExpand
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The Dogmatism Puzzle
According to the Dogmatism Puzzle, knowledge breeds dogmatism: if a subject knows a proposition h, then she is justified in disregarding any future evidence against h, for she knows that suchExpand
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Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation
What sort of doxastic response is rational to learning that one disagrees with an epistemic peer who has evaluated the same evidence? I argue that even weak general recommendations run the risk ofExpand
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Externalism and a priori knowledge of the world: Why privileged access is not the issue
I look at incompatibilist arguments aimed at showing that the conjunction of the thesis that a subject has privileged, a priori access to the contents of her own thoughts, on the one hand, and ofExpand
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch
I formulate a resilient paradox about epistemic rationality, discuss and reject various solutions, and sketch a way out. The paradox exemplifies a tension between a wide range of views of epistemicExpand
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