Maria Goltsman

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This paper addresses the problem of data errors in discrete variables. When data errors occur, the observed variable is a misclassified version of the variable of interest, whose distribution is not identified. Inferential problems caused by data errors have been conceptualized through convolution and mixture models. This paper introduces the direct(More)
We compare three common dispute resolution processes — negotiation, mediation, and arbitration — in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Under negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. Under mediation, the parties communicate with a neutral third party who makes a non-binding recommendation. Under(More)
We examine the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and interbidder resale, where the winner resells to the losers. To influence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an(More)
This paper addresses the problem of data errors in discrete variables. When data errors occur, the observed variable is a misclassi…ed version of the variable of interest, whose distribution is not identi…ed. Inferential problems caused by data errors have been conceptualized through convolution and mixture models. This paper introduces the direct(More)
We analyze commitment to employment in an environment in which an infinitely lived firm faces a sequence of finitely lived workers who differ in their ability to produce output. A worker’s ability is initially unknown to both the worker and the firm. A worker’s effort affects the information on ability conveyed by his performance. We characterize equilibria(More)
We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We show that cheap talk between the firms cannot transmit any information. However, if the firms can communicate through a third party, communication can be informative even when it is not substantiated by any(More)
We analyze commitment to employment in an environment in which an infinitely lived firm faces a sequence of finitely lived workers who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of a worker is initially unknown to both the worker and the firm, and a worker’s effort affects the information on ability that is conveyed by performance. We(More)
Firms often specify break-up fees in their employment contracts where a worker is obligated to compensate the firm if he leaves to take up employment with a competitor. We highlight the role of such break-up fees in the presence of asymmetric information about the worker’s quality between the current employer and the outside labor market. Waldman (1984)(More)