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Efficiency and symmetric treatment of agents are the primary goals of resource allocation in environments without transfers. Focusing on ordinal mechanisms in which no small group of agents can substantially change the allocations of others, we show that all asymptotically efficient, symmetric, and asymptoti-cally strategy-proof mechanisms lead to the same(More)
Allocation and exchange of many discrete resources – such as kidneys or school seats – is conducted via direct mechanisms without monetary transfers. A primary concern in designing such mechanisms is the coordinated strategic behavior of market participants and its impact on resulting allocations. To assess the impact of this implementation constraint, we(More)
This paper analyzes the self-identi…cation process and its role in motivation. We build a model of self-con…dence where people have imperfect knowledge about their ability, which in most tasks is a complement to e¤ort in determining performance. Higher self-con…dence thus enhances motivation , and this creates incentives for the manipulation of(More)
We study the allocation and exchange of indivisible objects without monetary transfers. In market design literature, some problems that fall in this category are the house allocation problem with and without existing tenants, and the kidney exchange problem. We introduce a new class of direct mechanisms that we call "trading cycles with brokers and owners,"(More)
This paper studies many-to-one matching problems such as between students and colleges, and workers and firms in the general case, in which both peer effects and complementarities are allowed. In a matching, an agent on one side, say a firm, employs a subset of agents from the other side (workers), thus forming a coalition. The paper interprets an agent's(More)
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets: We establish the existence of stable matchings provided that externalities are positive and agents' choices satisfy substitutability, and we show that the standard insights of matching theory, such as the existence of side optimal stable matchings and the rural hospitals(More)
Random mechanisms have been used in real-life situations for reasons such as fairness. Voting and matching are two examples of such situations. We investigate whether desirable properties of a random mechanism survive decomposition of the mechanism as a lottery over deterministic mechanisms that also hold such properties. To this end, we represent(More)