Marek Pycia

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Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest(More)
We reexamine the canonical question of Myerson and Satterth-waite (1983) whether two parties can trade an indivisible good in a Pareto efficient way when they are both privately-informed about their valuations for the good. Relaxing the assumption that utilities are quasi-linear, we show that efficient trade is generically possible if agents' utility(More)
Random mechanisms have been used in real-life situations for reasons such as fairness. Voting and matching are two examples of such situations. We investigate whether desirable properties of a random mechanism survive decomposition of the mechanism as a lottery over deterministic mechanisms that also hold such properties. To this end, we represent(More)
We develop a one-to-one matching game where men and women (interns and employers, etc.) exert costly efforts to produce benefits for their partners. We prove the existence and Pareto optimality of interior stable allocations, and we characterize the relationship between players' costs, efforts, benefits, and payoffs in such allocations. We find, for(More)
Pay-as-bid auctions are frequently implemented when a single seller allocates multiple units of a homogeneous good, and are commonly used to sell treasury securities, allocate electricity generation, and distribute emissions credits. In this auction format, bidders submit demand curves to a seller who uses these stated demands to compute market-clearing(More)
This paper analyzes the choice of academic scientists to commercially exploit their research. I build a model of the timing of entry into commercial activities by an academic research team, and analyze the returns and costs of these activities. In order to focus on the peculiarities of academic entrepreneurship as opposed to industrial entrepreneurship, I(More)
I study a dynamic one-sided-offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller may receive an outside option, the value of which depends on the quality of the product. If the outside option is sufficiently important, there is an(More)
Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland. Since 1983, he has conducted research on auction theory and practice. This research appears in the leading economics journals. The main focus is the design of auctions for many related items. Applications include spectrum, energy, and financial auctions. On the practical side, he is(More)
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