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Allocation and exchange of many discrete resources – such as kidneys or school seats – is conducted via direct mechanisms without monetary transfers. A primary concern in designing such mechanisms is the coordinated strategic behavior of market participants and its impact on resulting allocations. To assess the impact of this implementation constraint, we(More)
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We show that Gul and Pesendorfer’s [Econometrica 69 (2001) 1403] representation result for preferences with temptation and self-control can be reexpressed in terms of a costly intrapersonal conflict between a Planner and Doer, as in Thaler and Shefrin [J. Political Econ. 89 (1981) 392] and psychologists’ standard view of self-control problems.  2002(More)
We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no(More)
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets: We establish the existence of stable matchings provided that externalities are positive and agents’ choices satisfy substitutability, and we show that the standard insights of matching theory, such as the existence of side optimal stable matchings and the rural hospitals(More)