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One of the main elements of the current reform of electricity trading in the UK is the change from a uniform price auction in the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. We analyse this change under two polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopo-listic supply), with demand uncertainty. We …nd that under perfect competition there is a(More)
Bovine neurophysin II was partially digested by chymotrypsin and by chymotrypsin followed by carboxy-peptidase B to produce large fragments collectively representing deletions of residues 1-5 and 91-95. All such fragments were capable of binding peptides to the principal hormone-binding site of neurophysin with normal or near-normal affinity, indicating(More)
The possibility of resale after an auction attracts speculators (i.e., bidders who have no use value for the objects on sale). In a multi-object auction, a high-value bidder may strictly prefer to let a speculator win some of the objects and then buy in the resale market, in order to keep the auction price low for the objects she wins in the auction.(More)
We have assembled a new dataset and we have empirically investigated the effects of subcontracting on the bidding price in auctions for the awarding of public contracts in Italy. The required qualification for firms aiming to bid for Italian public contracts determines different subcontracting formats: according to this system, bidding firms can be(More)
This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile network operators in the presence of call externalities and network effects. It shows that the regulation of mobile termination rates based on " long-run incremental costs " increases networks' strategic incentives to inefficiently set high on-net/off-net price differentials, thus(More)
An estimated 35 to 50 million Americans have no medical insurance; the vast majority are employed persons and their dependents. This phenomenological study was developed to make visible the experience of working Americans living on the edge-forced to walk a fine line between health and illness without the safety net of medical insurance. A purposive sample(More)
When do competing principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents? Information sharing a¤ects contracting relationships within opponent organizations and induces players'strategies to be correlated via the distortions channel. We show that principals' incentives to share information depend on the nature(More)