Marco Pagnozzi

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One of the main elements of the current reform of electricity trading in the UK is the change from a uniform price auction in the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. We analyse this change under two polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopolistic supply), with demand uncertainty. We ...nd that under perfect competition there is a(More)
Bovine neurophysin II was partially digested by chymotrypsin and by chymotrypsin followed by carboxy-peptidase B to produce large fragments collectively representing deletions of residues 1-5 and 91-95. All such fragments were capable of binding peptides to the principal hormone-binding site of neurophysin with normal or near-normal affinity, indicating(More)
The possibility of resale after an auction attracts speculators (i.e., bidders who have no use value for the objects on sale). In a multi-object auction, a high-value bidder may strictly prefer to let a speculator win some of the objects and then buy in the resale market, in order to keep the auction price low for the objects she wins in the auction.(More)
An auction marketplace like eBay consists of (i) an individual auction design; and (ii) a multiauction platform design, i.e., the set of rules that organize and convey information about multiple individual auctions. This paper shows that two aspects of eBay’s platform design –sequencing of auctions by unique ending time, and provision of information about(More)
We have assembled a new dataset and we have empirically investigated the effects of subcontracting on the bidding price in auctions for the awarding of public contracts in Italy. The required qualification for firms aiming to bid for Italian public contracts determines different subcontracting formats: according to this system, bidding firms can be(More)
This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile network operators in the presence of call externalities and network effects. It shows that the regulation of mobile termination rates based on “long-run incremental costs” increases networks’ strategic incentives to inefficiently set high on-net/off-net price differentials, thus harming(More)
We study how vertical integration in regulated network industries affects the acquisition and transmission of socially valuable information on demand. We consider a regulated upstream monopoly with downstream unregulated Cournot competition and demand uncertainty. Demand information serves to set the access price and to foster competition in the unregulated(More)
In this paper, we study bidding behavior by firms in beauty-contest auctions, i.e. auctions in which the winning bid is the one which gets closest to some function (average) of all submitted bids. Using a dataset on public procurement beauty-contest auctions in Italy and exploiting a change in the auction format, we show that firms’ observed bidding(More)
When do competing principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents? Information sharing a¤ects contracting relationships within opponent organizations and induces players’strategies to be correlated via the distortions channel. We show that principals’incentives to share information depend on the nature(More)