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In this paper we use defense trees, an extension of attack trees with countermeasures, to represent attack scenarios and game theory to detect the most promising actions attacker and defender. On one side the attacker wants to break the system (with as little efforts as possible), on the opposite side the defender want to protect it (sustaining the minimum… (More)

We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. These bounds are based on the convexity properties of the range of utility vectors associated to all possible divisions of the good. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed… (More)

In this paper we consider the classical problem of dividing a land among many agents so that everybody is satisfied with the parcel she receives. In the literature, it is usually assumed that all the agents are endowed with cardinally comparable, additive, and monotone utility functions. In many economic and political situations violations of these… (More)

We consider the problem of allocating a finite number of indivisible items to two players with additive utilities. We design a procedure that looks for all the maximin allocations. The procedure makes repeated use of an extension of the Adjusted Winner, an effective procedure that deals with divisible items, to find new candidate solutions, and to suggest… (More)

We consider the division of a finite number of homogeneous divisi-ble items among three players. Under the assumption that each player assigns a positive value to every item, we characterize the optimal allocations and we develop two exact algorithms for its search. Both the characterization and the algorithm are based on the tight relationship two… (More)

In Briata, Dall'Aglio and Fragnelli (2012), the authors introduce a cooperative game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among completely risk-averse agents involved in a fair division procedure introduced by Knaster (1946). In this paper we analyze the features of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of the game, and propose a… (More)

The classical Bayesian posterior arises naturally as the unique solution of several different optimization problems, without the necessity of interpreting data as conditional probabilities and then using Bayes' Theorem. For example, the classical Bayesian posterior is the unique posterior that minimizes the loss of Shannon information in combining the prior… (More)

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