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Inexperienced women, along with economics and business majors, are much more susceptible to the winner's curse, as are subjects with lower SAT/ACT scores. There are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced(More)
In a trust game experiment, we elicited choices using either the so-called game or strategy method. While the two methods yield similar rates of trust, the strategy method reveals a significantly lower rate of trustworthiness. 1. Introduction Experimental economists are increasingly using the strategy method for eliciting choices in laboratory and field(More)
We study the community governance of common property resources with the goal of understanding why a legal institution is sometimes chosen over informal cooperation achieved through repeated interaction. After a game-theoretic and property rights analysis of the two regimes, we present empirical findings from pasture and forest management of 13 th-19 th(More)
It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these(More)
Extensive evidence from laboratory experiments indicates that many individuals are willing to use costly punishment to enforce social norms, even in one-shot interactions. However, there appears to be little evidence in the literature of such behavior in the field. We study the propensity to punish norm violators in a natural field experiment conducted in(More)
This paper studies how groups resolve disagreement when they must reach unanimity after submitting individual proposals and exchanging text-form messages via a chat window in lottery choice experiments. We find that the majority proposal does not always prevail. The minority proposal prevails sometimes, especially when it is closer to risk neutrality. About(More)
This paper studies collusion in an in¯nitely repeated game when the oppo-nent's past actions are observed only through a noisy public signal. Attention is focused on a threshold strategy, which switches between cooperation and punishment phases based on the comparison between the realized public signal and a threshold. The paper identi¯es su±cient(More)
We study interactions with different durations and termination rules in a (quasi) continuous-time prisoner's dilemma experiment. We find that cooperation is easier to achieve and sustain with deter-ministic horizons than with stochastic ones; end-game effects emerge, but subjects postpone them with experience; longer duration helps cooperation. Static(More)
 When behaviour in society is heterogeneous, without tokens cooperation collapses  In contrast, the use of tokens makes cooperation evolutionarily stable  Tokens endogenously became money: subjects took to reward help with a token and to demand a token in exchange for help  Subjects trusted that strangers would return help for a token
We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools(More)