Marco Casari

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We study the community governance of common property resources with the goal of understanding why a legal institution is sometimes chosen over informal cooperation achieved through repeated interaction. After a game-theoretic and property rights analysis of the two regimes, we present empirical findings from pasture and forest management of 13-19 century(More)
Inexperienced women, along with economics and business majors, are much more susceptible to the winner’s curse, as are subjects with lower SAT/ACT scores. There are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced(More)
This paper studies collusion in an in ̄nitely repeated game when the opponent's past actions are observed only through a noisy public signal. Attention is focused on a threshold strategy, which switches between cooperation and punishment phases based on the comparison between the realized public signal and a threshold. The paper identi ̄es su±cient(More)
This paper experimentally compares the performance of four simultaneous lottery contests: a grand contest, two multiple prize settings (equal and unequal prizes), and a contest which consists of two subcontests. Consistent with the theory, the grand contest generates the highest effort levels among all simultaneous contests. In multi-prize settings, equal(More)
An agent with dynamically inconsistent preferences may deviate from her plan of action as the future draws near. An exponential discounter may do exactly the same when facing an uncertain future. Through an experiment we compare preference-based vs. uncertainty-based explanations for choice reversal over time by eliciting choices for pre-commitment and(More)
We present the first lab-in-the field experimental study of the North-South divide in Italy. Using a representative sample of the population, we measure whether regional di↵erences in the ability to cooperate emerge even when ruling out confounding factors due to geography, institutions, and criminal intrusion. We find that people in the North achieve(More)
Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment among Students and Clerical Workers We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities.(More)
We study interactions with different durations and termination rules in a (quasi) continuous-time prisoner’s dilemma experiment. We find that cooperation is easier to achieve and sustain with deterministic horizons than with stochastic ones; end-game effects emerge, but subjects postpone them with experience; longer duration helps cooperation. Static(More)