Marco A. Marini

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This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a " first mover advantage ". We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response noncooper-atively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic(More)
This paper presents synthetically some recent developments in the theory of coalition and network formation. For this purpose, some major equilibrium concepts recently introduced to model the formation of coalition structures and networks among players are brie ‡y reviewed and discussed. A few economic applications are also illustrated to give a ‡avour of(More)
We study the stability properties of organizations in partition function games, describing cooperative situations with externalities. An organization is defined as a group of agents, together with a set of bilateral relations, formally, a connected graph. Because of the presence of externalities, the profitability of coalitional threats to an organization(More)
This paper studies how the possibility for …rms to sign collusive agreements (as for instance being part of alliances, cartels and mergers) may a¤ect their quality and price choice in a market with vertically di¤erentiated goods. For this purpose we model the …rm decisions as a three-stage game in which, at the …rst stage, …rms can form an alliance via a(More)
In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically di¤erentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some …rms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct …rm. We analyse whether pruning emerges and, if so, a …ghting brand is marketed. We …nd that it is(More)