Our previous research presents a methodology of cooperative problem solving for belief-desire-intention (BDI) systems, based on a complete formal theory called TEAMLOG. This covers both a static part, defining individual, bilateral and collective agent attitudes, and a dynamic part, describing system reconfiguration in a dynamic, unpredictable environment.… (More)
Our previous research presents a methodology of cooperative problem solving for BDI systems, based on a complete formal theory. This covers both a static part, defining individual, bilateral and collective agent attitudes, and a dynamic part, describing system reconfiguration in a dynamic , unpredictable environment. In this paper, we investigate the… (More)
Theories of multiagent systems (MAS), in particular those based on modal logics, often suffer from a high computational complexity. This is due in part to the combination of agents' individual attitudes (beliefs, goals and intentions), and even more importantly to the presence of group attitudes, such as common belief and collective intention.
We study a non-symmetric variant of General Lotto games introduced in Hart (Int J Game Theory 36:441–460, 2008). We provide a complete characterization of optimal strategies for both players in non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games, where one of the players has an advantage over the other. By this we complete the characterization given in Hart (Int J… (More)
Infrastructure networks – in communication and transport – are a key feature of an economy. The functionality of these networks depends on the connectivity and sizes of different components. However, these networks face a variety of threats ranging from natural disasters to intelligent attacks (carried out by human agents). How should networks be defended… (More)
Players are endowed with resources. A player can engage in conflict with others to enlarge his resources. The set of potential conflicts is defined by a contiguity network. Players are farsighted and aim to maximize their resources. They decide on whether to wage war or remain peaceful. The winner of a war takes control of the loser's node and resources; he… (More)
The aim of the paper is to consider a game-theoretic properties of strategies available to players in dialogue games. We treat speech acts formulated in a dialogue as moves in a dialogue game and rules for their appropriateness as rules of this game. We would like to analyze dialogical systems as a Nash-style games, and explore verification possibilities… (More)
Individuals derive benefits from their connections, but these may expose them to external threats. Individuals therefore invest in security to protect themselves. What are the network architectures that maximize collective welfare? We propose a model to explore the tension between connectivity and exposure to an external threat when security choices are… (More)