Our previous research presents a methodology of cooperative problem solving for belief-desire-intention (BDI) systems, based on a complete formal theory called TEAMLOG. This covers both a static part, defining individual, bilateral and collective agent attitudes, and a dynamic part, describing system reconfiguration in a dynamic, unpredictable environment.… (More)
Our previous research presents a methodology of cooperative problem solving for BDI systems, based on a complete formal theory. This covers both a static part, defining individual, bilateral and collective agent attitudes, and a dynamic part, describing system reconfiguration in a dynamic, unpredictable environment. In this paper, we investigate the… (More)
Theories of multiagent systems (MAS), in particular those based on modal logics, often suffer from a high computational complexity. This is due in part to the combination of agents' individual attitudes (beliefs, goals and intentions), and even more importantly to the presence of group attitudes, such as common belief and collective intention.
1 We are grateful to Sandro Brusco for several insights and detailed comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. Abstract We study a model of political competition between two candidates with two orthogonal issues, where candidates are office motivated and committed to a particular position in one of the dimensions, while having the freedom to… (More)
Infrastructure networks – in communication and transport – are a key feature of an economy. The functionality of these networks depends on the connectivity and sizes of different components. However, these networks face a variety of threats ranging from natural disasters to intelligent attacks (carried out by human agents). How should networks be defended… (More)
We study a non-symmetric variant of General Lotto games introduced in Hart (Int J Game Theory 36:441–460, 2008). We provide a complete characterization of optimal strategies for both players in non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games, where one of the players has an advantage over the other. By this we complete the characterization given in Hart (Int J… (More)
We consider the Hotelling-Downs model with n ≥ 2 office seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilib-ria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are… (More)
Individuals derive benefits from their connections, but these may, at the same time, transmit external threats. Individuals therefore invest in security to protect themselves. However, the incentives to invest in security depend on their network exposures. We study the problem of designing a network that provides the right individual incentives. Motivated… (More)