We present a modal logic for reasoning about what groups of agents can bring about by collective action. Given a set of states, we introduce game frames which associate with every state a strategic game among the agents. Game frames are essentially extensive games of perfect information with simultaneous actions, where every action profile is associated… (More)
Contents Acknowledgments ix Abstract xi Samenvatting xiii 1 Let the Games Begin 1 1.
Game Logic GL, introduced in 188, is examined from a game-theoretic perspective. A new semantics for GL is proposed in terms of untyped games which are closely related to extensive game forms of perfect information. An example is given of how GL can be used as a formal model of game situations, and some metatheoretic results are presented in the context of… (More)
An extension of the WHILE-language is developed for programming game-theoretic mechanisms involving multiple agents. Examples of such mechanisms include auctions, voting procedures, and negotiation protocols. A structured operational semantics is provided in terms of extensive games of almost perfect information. Hoare-style partial correctness assertions… (More)
Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory are usually compared either regarding the normative plausibility or regarding the logical strength of the axioms involved. Here, instead, we propose to compare axiomatizations according to the language used for expressing the axioms. In order to carry out such a comparison, we suggest a formalist… (More)
We advance two main claims. The first is that logics — and in particular, modal strategy logics — are a powerful formal tool for representing and reasoning about the properties of game theoretic mechanisms. The second is that techniques developed for the formal specification and verification of computer systems (and in particular , the use of logic for… (More)