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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle
One explanation of rational peer disagreement is that agents find themselves in an epistemically permissive situation. In fact, some authors have suggested that, while evidence could be impermissiveExpand
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EPISTEMIC AKRASIA AND EPISTEMIC REASONS
ABSTRACT It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicateExpand
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Epistemic Uniqueness and the Practical Relevance of Epistemic Practices
By taking the practical relevance of coordinated epistemic standards into account, Dogramaci and Horowitz (Philosophical Issues, 26(1), 130–147, 2016) as well as Greco and Hedden (The Journal ofExpand
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One standard to rule them all
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The explanatory role of consistency requirements
TLDR
In this paper, I defend a new account of the explanatory role of the requirement of epistemic consistency. Expand
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Testing Minimax for Rational Ignorant Agents
TLDR
We argue that, since Pettigrew’s Minimax is impermissive, an argument against credence permissiveness constitutes an argument in favour of Minimx, and that arguments for credencepermissiveness are arguments against MinimAX. Expand
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False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence
The normativity of epistemic rationality
A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence
Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: (i) A is epistemically permitted (or required) to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, (ii) incoherentExpand
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