María Elena Iñarra García

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This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching , there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable(More)
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce maximum irreversible matchings and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [3]) and maximum stable matchings (Tan [32], [34]). These solution concepts are all core consistent. We find that almost stable matchings are(More)
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in that sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoner's dilemma.(More)