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In this work, we introduce and study a new, potentially rich model for selfish routing over non-cooperative networks as an interesting hybridization of the two prevailing such models, namely the KP model [26] and the W model [36]. In the hybrid model, each of n users is using a mixed strategy to ship its unsplittable traffic over a network consisting of m(More)
We study Nash equilibria in a discrete routing game that combines features of the two most famous models for non-cooperative routing, the KP model [16] and the Wardrop model [27]. In our model, users share parallel links. A user strategy can be any probability distribution over the set of links. Each user tries to minimize its expected latency, where the(More)
A Nash equilibrium of a routing network represents a stable state of the network where no user finds it beneficial to unilaterally deviate from its routing strategy. In this work, we investigate the structure of such equilibria within the context of a certain game that models selfish routing for a set of n users each shipping its traffic over a network(More)
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