A characterization theorem of the core of two-sided matching problems is proved. The theorem characterizes the core by means of four axioms, the Pareto optimality, consistency, converse consistency, and anonymity. It is shown that all of them are logically independent.
Keywords: Many-to-one matching market Externalities Stability a b s t r a c t We study a labor market described by a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms in which each firm's preferences depend not only on workers whom it hires, but also on workers whom its rival firms hire. We define a new stability concept called weak stability and… (More)
In this work, the authors study Bonnet Problems using Cartan moving frames and associated structure equations. The Cartan structural forms are written in terms of the first and second fundamental forms, and the Lax system is consequently reinterpreted; orthonormal moving frames are obtained solutions to this Bonnet-Lax system, via numerical integration.… (More)