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  • Influence
Infrastructure Investment and Incentives with Supranational Funding
Public infrastructure investment is usually co-financed by supranational organizations. The selection of projects is supposed to be decided using the information provided by conventional cost-benefitExpand
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The effects of airline and high speed train integration
With a theoretical model we analyze the social and environmental effects of airline and HST integration in two different scenarios: airports with capacity constraints and airports with low airlineExpand
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A new era for airport regulators through capacity investments
Private and public airports' optimal actions may not coincide. While private airports usually pursue profit maximization, publicly owned airports look for maximum social welfare. Thus, the pricesExpand
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Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture
Abstract We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of an RJV, assuming that Government intervention is subject to an additional adverse selectionExpand
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Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring
We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problemExpand
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Mergers and the importance of fitting well
Abstract This paper highlights the importance of partners fitting well for a stable merger to arise. If all firms fit perfectly, no stable merger can be performed. On the contrary, if not all firmsExpand
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Co-financing of infrastructure and regional governments' incentives
Large infrastructure projects usually require co-financing by the central government. In a context of asymmetric information, the way in which projects are financed might encourage regionalExpand
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The effectiveness of the Spanish urban transport contracts in terms of incentives
We consider a principal-agent model in which the regulator faces a moral hazard problem as he cannot observe the effort exerted by public transit operators. In this context, we analyse theExpand
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Trade-offs between environmental regulation and market competition: Airlines, emission trading systems and entry deterrence
The emission trading system (ETS) is being applied worldwide in different economic sectors as an environmental regulatory tool to induce reductions of CO2 emissions. In Europe the system has beenExpand
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