• Publications
  • Influence
On choosing rationally when preferences are fuzzy
Abstract In real life, exact choices are induced by fuzzy preferences. These choices eventually satisfy certain plausible rationality properties. Several alternative rules for generating exactExpand
Social choice and welfare
ed/Indexed in: ABS Academic Journal Quality Guide, CSA Political Science & Government, CSA Sociological Abstracts, Current
The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
In 1980 Rubinstein introduced a new solution concept for voting games called the stability set which incorporates the idea that before entering into a possibly winning coalition with respect to someExpand
Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games
In this paper, we have investigated two subrelations of a domination relation which is the classical collective relation in voting games. These two subrelations, due to Gillies and Miller, have someExpand
Rationality and aggregation of preferences in an ordinally fuzzy framework
Abstract The paper explores the problem of aggregating ordinally fuzzy individual preferences into ordinally fuzzy social preferences. Using Goguen's ordinal formulation of fuzziness, it is shownExpand
Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics
This book presents an overview of developments in social choice theory and welfare economics, drawn from the proceedings of the eighth conference in the International Symposia in Economic Theory andExpand
Continuity of utility functions representing fuzzy preferences
It is shown that this new condition and the conditions introduced in the previous paper are together necessary and sufficient for a numerical representation of a given weakly complete fuzzy pre-order by a continuous utility function. Expand
Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
In 1970 Amartya Sen introduced within social choice theory the notion of minimal liberty and proved an impossibility result concerning social decision functions. In this paper, Sen’s condition ofExpand