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Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.
Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits†destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if
The logic of collective action : public goods and the theory of groups
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular
Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies
We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national
The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force
If the leader of a bandit gang in an anarchy can hold a territory, he gains from becoming a public-good-providing autocrat. His monopoly over crime gives him an "encompassing" stake in the
Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance
We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called “contract-intensive money” or CIM, is based on
An economic theory of alliances
Abstract : The report presents a new theoretical model of military alliances and other international organizations. The assumptions basic to the model are that nations act in their own best interests