M. Montero

Publications59
h-index13
Citations525
Highly Influential Citations38
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  • Publications
  • Influence
Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
  • M. Montero
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • Games Econ. Behav.
  • 1 February 2006
TLDR
This paper studies coalition formation, payoff division and expected payoffs in a “divide the dollar by majority rule” game with random proposers. Expand
  • 71
  • 7
On the Nucleolus as a Power Index
This paper argues that the nucleolus can compete with the Shapley value as a measure of P-power. It currently has more solid noncooperative foundations for majority games. It also identifies a set of… Expand
  • 28
  • 5
Enlargement and the balance of power: an experimental study
TLDR
Theoretical analysis suggests that enlargement of a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Expand
  • 23
  • 3
  • PDF
Only half the transcriptomic differences between resistant genetically modified and conventional rice are associated with the transgene.
Besides the intended effects that give a genetically modified (GM) plant the desired trait, unintended differences between GM and non-GM comparable plants may also occur. Profiling technologies allow… Expand
  • 42
  • 2
Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics
TLDR
We analyze and evaluate the di¤erent decision rules describing the Council of Ministers of the EU starting from 1958 up to date and show that Germany should receive more than the other three large countries under the optimal voting rule. Expand
  • 43
  • 2
  • PDF
Gaining power through enlargement: Strategic foundations and experimental evidence
TLDR
We show that the addition of a new member to a voting body may increase the voting power of some original members even if the voting body is deciding over the allocation of a fixed pie, and the relative voting weights of the original members and the decision rule remain constant. Expand
  • 38
  • 2
  • PDF
Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel
  • M. Montero
  • Computer Science, Economics
  • Games Econ. Behav.
  • 1 November 2002
TLDR
This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Expand
  • 23
  • 2
  • PDF
The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games
TLDR
The invention relates to a package handling and sorting system which sorts small packages according to destination, segregating those with the same destinations for combined shipments. Expand
  • 29
  • 2
  • PDF
Enlargement and the Balance of Power: An Experimental Study
TLDR
We show that enlargement of the voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Expand
  • 30
  • 2
The Paradox of New Members in the Council of Ministers: A Noncooperative Approach
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant.… Expand
  • 7
  • 2
  • PDF