• Publications
  • Influence
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
We study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks, when self-interested individuals have the discretion to form or sever links. First, in the context of two stylized models, we
The Diffusion of Microfinance
The results suggest that a model of diffusion can distinguish information passing from endorsement effects, and that understanding the nature of transmission may be important in identifying the ideal places to inject information.
The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
This work considers the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings, and shows that if coalitions can be ordered according to some characteristic over which players have single-peaked preferences, then there exists an individually stable coalition partition.
The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks
It is shown that in some cases, the evolutionary process selects inefficient networks even though eAEcient ones are statically stable, and there are contexts in which the evolutionarily stable networks coincide with the core stable networks, and thus achieve eAEciency.
Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds
It is shown that all opinions in a large society converge to the truth if and only if the influence of the most influential agent vanishes as the society grows.
Financial Networks and Contagion
We study cascades of failures in a network of interdependent financial organizations: how discontinuous changes in asset values (e.g., defaults and shutdowns) trigger further failures, and how this
The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality
We develop a model where agents obtain information about job opportunities through an explicitly modeled network of social contacts. We show that employment is positively correlated across time and
A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency
I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the
An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation
We develop a model of friendship formation that sheds light on segregation patterns observed in social and economic networks. Individuals come in different types and have type-dependent benefits from
Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random are Social Networks?
It is shown that as the random/network-based meeting ratio varies, the resulting degree distributions can be ordered in the sense of stochastic dominance, which allows us to infer how the formation process affects average utility in the network.