The security of the multi-authority voting protocol of Benaloh and Tuinstra is analyzed and it is demonstrated that this protocol is not receiptfree, opposed to what was claimed in the paper and was believed before.
This protocol provides perfect security against an active, adaptive adversary corrupting t < n/3 players, which is optimal, and improves the efficiency of perfectly secure MPC protocols by a factor of Ω(n2).
This paper observes that a subprotocol of Rabin and Ben-Or's, known as weak secret sharing (WSS), is not secure against an adaptive adversary, and proposes new and adaptively secure protocols for WSS, VSS and MPC that are substantially more efficient than the original ones.
It is proved that for every function there exists a protocol secure against a set of potential passive collusions if and only if no two of these collusions add up to the full player set.
This work formally defines what it means to simulate a player by a multiparty protocol among a set of (new) players, and derives the resilience of the new protocol as a function of the resiliences of the original protocol and the protocol used for the simulation.
This paper presents the first BA protocol in which the message is communicated only O(n) times (the hidden factor is less than 2), which is optimal for the consensus variant of BA.
A very efficient multi-party computation protocol unconditionally secure against an active adversary, where the corrupted players are guaranteed not to deviate from the protocol.
This work presents an active MPC protocol that provides optimal (t < n/2) security and communicates only O(n 2 ) field elements per multiplication, and is to be compared with the most efficient previously known protocol for the same model.
The proposed MPC protocol is the first protocol with perfect security against an active, adaptive adversary corrupting t < n/4 players, which is optimal, and is as efficient as the most efficient perfectly secure protocol for the synchronous model and the mostefficient asynchronous protocol with cryptographic security.
An efficient protocol for secure multi-party computation in the asynchronous model with optimal resilience, based on a public-key encryption scheme with threshold decryption and employing several techniques, including circuit randomization due to Beaver, and an abstraction of certificates, which can be of independent interest.