Deploying sensor networks with guaranteed capacity and fault tolerance
- Jonathan Bredin, E. Demaine, M. Hajiaghayi, D. Rus
- Computer ScienceACM Interational Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc…
- 25 May 2005
This work designs and analyzes the first algorithms that place an almost-minimum number of additional sensors to augment an existing network into a k-connected network, for any desired parameter k, and proves that the number ofAdditional sensors is within a constant factor of the absolute minimum for any fixed k.
Combination can be hard: approximability of the unique coverage problem
- E. Demaine, U. Feige, M. Hajiaghayi, M. Salavatipour
- Computer ScienceACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
- 22 January 2006
It is shown that the inapproximability results extend to envy-free pricing, an important problem in computational economics, and how the (budgeted) unique coverage problem has close connections to other theoretical problems including max cut, maximum coverage, and radio broad-casting.
The prize-collecting generalized steiner tree problem via a new approach of primal-dual schema
- M. Hajiaghayi, K. Jain
- Mathematics, Computer ScienceACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
- 22 January 2006
This paper fuse the primal-dual schema with Farkas lemma to obtain a combinatorial 3-approximation algorithm for the Prize-Collecting Generalized Steiner Tree problem, and shows that the k-forest problem is much harder to approximate.
Improved approximation algorithms for minimum-weight vertex separators
- U. Feige, M. Hajiaghayi, James R. Lee
- Mathematics, Computer ScienceSymposium on the Theory of Computing
- 22 May 2005
The algorithmic theory of vertex separators, and its relation to the embeddings of certain metric spaces is developed, and an O(√log n) pseudo-approximation for finding balanced vertices in general graphs is exhibited.
Online auctions with re-usable goods
- M. Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, D. Parkes
- EconomicsACM Conference on Economics and Computation
- 5 June 2005
This paper provides two characterizations for the class of truthful online allocation rules, and provides a randomized online auction that achieves a competitive ratio of O(log h), where h is the ratio of maximum value to minimum value among the agents.
Regret minimization and the price of total anarchy
- A. Blum, M. Hajiaghayi, Katrina Ligett, Aaron Roth
- EconomicsSymposium on the Theory of Computing
- 17 May 2008
It is proved that despite the weakened assumptions, in several broad classes of games, this "price of total anarchy" matches the Nash price of anarchy, even though play may never converge to Nash equilibrium.
Submodular secretary problem and extensions
- M. Bateni, M. Hajiaghayi, Morteza Zadimoghaddam
- Mathematics, Computer ScienceTALG
- 1 September 2010
This article considers a very general setting of the classic secretary problem, in which the goal is to select k secretaries so as to maximize the expectation of a submodular function which defines efficiency of the selected secretarial group based on their overlapping skills, and presents the first constant-competitive algorithm for this case.
Online prophet-inequality matching with applications to ad allocation
- S. Alaei, M. Hajiaghayi, Vahid Liaghat
- EconomicsACM Conference on Economics and Computation
- 4 June 2012
We study the problem of online prophet-inequality matching in bipartite graphs. There is a static set of bidders and an online stream of items. We represent the interest of bidders in items by a…
Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities
- M. Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, T. Sandholm
- EconomicsAAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- 22 July 2007
By combining dynamic programming with prophet inequalities (a technique from optimal stopping theory), this work is able to design and analyze online mechanisms which are temporally strategyproof and approximately efficiency-maximizing and prove new prophet inequalities motivated by the auction setting.
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
- M. Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, D. Parkes
- EconomicsACM Conference on Economics and Computation
- 17 May 2004
A limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically, is studied and strategyproof mechanisms which are constant-competitive for revenue and efficiency are derived.
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